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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to study the consequences of using
the Farrell and Shapiro (1990) su¢ cient condition for merger approval
to sectors in which a downstream horizontal merger may also a¤ect
upstream rms. As will be shown below, in some circumstances the
sign of the relevant external e¤ect can no longer be established by
considering the merger as a sequence of innitesimal mergers, each
corresponding to a marginal change in output.
1 Introduction
Analyzing the e¤ects of a horizontal merger is controversial, mainly due to
the fact that the e¢ ciencies or synergies involved are not observable by the
authorities. To overcome this di¢ culty, Farrell & Shapiro (1990) (hereon
F&S) established a su¢ cient condition for a merger to be welfare enhancing
that does not depend on the magnitude of such cost reductions. Assuming
that the merger is protable for the participating rms (otherwise it would
not take place), the su¢ cient condition states that the external e¤ect of
the merger (the e¤ect on consumer surplus, CS, plus prots by rms not
participating in the merger, O) has to be positive. It is implicitly assumed
that no other agents are a¤ected by the merger. However, upstream rms
(such as suppliers of inputs for the market in question) may be a¤ected by
a downstream horizontal merger in at least two di¤erent ways. Firstly, by
changing the output level in the downstream market, the merger is likely to
a¤ect the prices and output levels in any upstream input industry. Secondly,
even if output is held constant, some of the insiders cost reductions are likely
to be obtained at the expense of the upstream rms. For instance, the merger
may be a way of increasing buyer power and the resulting gains for insiders
correspond to losses for a third party that should be considered. Such is the
DCSA, Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia da Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Quinta
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case of mergers in the retailing sector that have had some relevance in the
recent past both in Europe and the US.
Figure 1 illustrates a possible decision error when upstream producers
prots, P , are not considered in the assessment of the external e¤ect of the
merger. In this gure it is implicit that these domestic producers will see
their prots decline as a result of the merger. This will be explained below.
I
CS +O
 P
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Figure 1: Error when neglecting upstream rms
The negatively sloped straight line (that does not cross the origin) rep-
resents the set of mergers that do not a¤ect welfare, that is, mergers such
that CS+O+I+P = 0. Mergers in area A are welfare decreas-
ing but would be approved if the F&S condition was directly applied, for
instance, to the retailing sector or to any other sector with a small degree
of vertical integration, where upstream rms play a relevant role. This hap-
pens because the condition only requires that CS+O > 0. In order to
have a su¢ cient condition for aggregate welfare to increase after the merger,
it is necessary to include the e¤ect on the producersprots.
The purpose of this note is to study the consequences of using the F&S
condition to sectors in which a downstream horizontal merger may also a¤ect
upstream rms. As will be shown below, in some circumstances the sign
of the relevant external e¤ect can no longer be established by considering
the merger as a sequence of innitesimal mergers, each corresponding to a
marginal change in output.
Other work extending the Farrell & Shapiro (1990) results is due to
Barros & Cabral (1994) and Barros (1997), while the innitesimal approach
was also followed, for instance, by Verboven (1995).
The following section presents the relevant condition when the price of
inputs depends on the aggregate output level in the downstream industry.
The F&S condition appears as a particular case and the di¤erences are
highlighted. The third section discusses alternative conditions when input
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producers are a¤ected not only by the change in output but also lose on the
bargaining table. Finally, section 4 concludes.
2 Price taking suppliers
The technique used by Farrell & Shapiro (1990) is to measure how an in-
nitesimal change in the quantity produced by the insider rms a¤ects non
participating agents after the new post-merger Cournot-Nash equilibrium
is reached. The merger is assumed to change aggregate quantity and its
distribution amongst rms as well as the cost function of the insider rms.
Under some conditions concerning the demand and cost functions, the
total change in external welfare is of the same sign of the variation resulting
from a marginal change in quantity.1 Therefore it su¢ ces to analyze the
latter and the magnitude of the eventual and unobservable change in the
insiders cost function is irrelevant as long as the sign of the change in
their output is well dened. F&S establish conditions under which insiders
aggregate output declines and study the external e¤ect in the case those
conditions are veried.2 Throughout the paper only output reducing mergers
will be considered.
We assume that nal demand for a given product, P (Q); is negatively
sloped and is served by a set of n rms that simultaneously choose the
quantity they place in this market. Firms producing output qi have total
costs given by ci(qi) + C(Q)qi where the rst term represents the costs
internal to the rm and the second term the costs related to the purchase
of inputs. If one considers these rms as retailers, ci(qi) can be thought
of as the marketing and selling costs while C(Q)qi represents the costs of
acquiring the product that retailers re-sell. The producers of inputs are
assumed to be price takers and to have an aggregate supply curve given by
C(Q); with @C=@Q  0: This curve is the horizontal sum of the individual
supply curves of a number of symmetric producers of which a percentage  is
assumed to be domestic. Downstream rms have some degree of monopsony
in the sense that they anticipate the impact that their output choices will
have on the inputs price.
After the announcement of a merger involving some of the downstream
competitors, these can be divided in three subsets: insiders, I, domestic
outsiders, ON and foreign outsiders, O.
Both before and after the merger, each of the downstream rms will
1The relevant conditions are that P 000; P 00 and c00i are all nonnegative and c
000
i is non-
positive for all nonparticipant rms, where x0 is the rst derivative of x see Proposition
5, p. 116 in Farrell & Shapiro (1990).
2The new cost function must be such that the merged rms markup at the pre-merger
level of output is less than the sum of the pre-merger markups of all insiders.
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maximize its prots given by
i(Q; qi) = P (Q)qi   ci(qi)  C(Q)qi (1)
for any i 2 ON [O. The corresponding rst-order and second-order condi-
tions are, respectively,
@P
@Q
qi + P (Q)  @ci
@qi
  C(Q)  @C
@Q
qi = 0 (2)
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
@P
@Q
  @C
@Q

+

@2P
@Q2
  @
2C
@Q2

qi   @
2ci
@qi2
< 0 (3)
Let V (Q)  P (Q) C(Q):We make the following assumptions regarding
this function:3
@V
@Q
+Q
@2V
@Q2
< 0;8Q : V (Q) > 0 (4)
@V
@Q
  @
2ci
@q2i
< 0 (5)
From the rst-order conditions, each rm will react to a rivals change
in quantity in accordance with
@qi
@q i
=  
@2V
@Q2
qi +
@V
@Q
@2V
@Q2
qi + 2
@V
@Q   @
2ci
@q2i
< 0 (6)
where q i  Q   qi: This is the slope of rm is best response function
and it is negative, given the assumptions above. Assumptions 4 and 5 also
guarantee that  1 < @qi@q i < 0: The slope of the reaction function is inferior
to one, meaning that the equilibrium is stable.
We can therefore establish that
dqi +
@qi
@q i
dqi =
@qi
@q i
dq i +
@qi
@q i
dqi , dqi =
@qi
@q i
1 + @qi@q i
dQ =  idQ (7)
with
i   
@2V
@Q2
qi +
@V
@Q
@V
@Q   @
2ci
@q2i
> 0 (8)
In the linear case, we have i = 1.
After a merger involving some of the downstream rms, the insiders
internal costs will change. The new function, cI(qI); is unknown to the
3These conditions assure the stability of the Cournot oligopoly as shown in Hahn (1962)
and Al-Nowaihi & Levine (1985). Levis (1982) shows that these conditions are su¢ cient
for the existence of a unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
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authorities. Assuming that these eventual cost reductions are su¢ ciently
large so that the merger is protable but small enough so that insiders
combined output declines, we can evaluate the impact on external welfare
of a marginal change in output.
Given that the merger is protable we only have to consider its domestic
external e¤ect, that is, the impact on consumers, domestic outsiders and
domestic producers.
XW =
Z Q
0
P (u)du  P (Q)Q

+
X
i2ON
(P (Q)qi   ci(qi)  C(Q)qi)
+ 

C(Q)Q 
Z Q
0
C(u)du

(9)
The main di¤erences from the Barros & Cabral (1994) setting is that (i)
costs are also a function of aggregate output rather than individual output
and (ii) the impact of the merger on any domestic producers is accounted
for. Figure 2 illustrates these di¤erences. Total output falls from Q0 to Q1
while outsiders aggregate production expands from Qo0 to Q
o
1:
In the original case, a decrease in total production will lower consumer
surplus while increasing the outsidersearnings. Consumers lose area c to
insiders while outsiders gain area o to the insider rms. This trade-o¤ is
still present here, but there are other benets for the outsiders, namely
a lower input unit price. If all rms are domestic this is a mere transfer
from upstream to downstream rms, given by the areas marked t, but when
we allow for foreign producers or outsiders it may be relevant. Additionally,
insiders also benet from this lower cost and gain area p from the producers.
Part of this area is considered a loss if there are domestic producers.
We will now follow the innitesimal merger approach to establish su¢ -
cient conditions for the merger to be welfare increasing.
Di¤erentiating XW and using the rst-order conditions for outsiders
prot maximization, 2, we have that
dXW
dQ
1
P
=

1
"D
+
C
P
1
"S
0@sI + sO   X
i2ON
sii
1A  (1  )C
P
1
"S
(10)
where "D =  @Q=@P P=Q is the elasticity of demand and "S = @Q=@C
C=Q denotes the elasticity of the supply of inputs. The innitesimal merger
has a positive impact on external welfare if and only if
sI + sO  
X
i2ON
sii <
1  
1 + "
S
"D
P
C
(11)
If all producers are domestic (that is, if  = 1) we have a condition
similar to the one proposed by Barros & Cabral (1994). The impact on the
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Figure 2: Impact of the innitesimal merger
external welfare of a marginal change in total output is larger but the sign
of the external e¤ect is dened by the same condition. The additional gain
for domestic outsiders that results from the reduction in total output (which
decreases the outsidersmarginal cost) is nothing but a loss for the domestic
input producers represented by area t and, consequently, the net domestic
e¤ect is null. When there are foreign input producers ( < 1) this e¤ect is
positive for the domestic economy and the condition becomes weaker. Note
also the this reduction in the outsidersmarginal cost depends crucially on
the elasticity of the supply of inputs. If "S ! 1 the reduction in total
output does not change the marginal cost, that is, C(Q) is constant. When
this happens the condition is the same as in Barros & Cabral (1994). The
fact that the marginal units are sold with no prots is relevant here. If these
units were sold with some prot, producers would even be worse o¤. This is
considered in the appendix. In general, the standard condition is too strong
and a number of welfare increasing mergers would not be automatically
cleared by the authorities, given that the safe harbor condition was not
satised. This may be especially relevant in sectors where a large percentage
of the inputs are imported or when the supply of inputs is particularly
inelastic:
3 Buyer power
In the case analyzed above, it is still possible to use the external e¤ect
approach to establish the safe harbor rule for merger approval. This happens
because the merger a¤ects all other agents via a change in the insiders
output and the external welfare is a continuous function of Q. Internal
cost reductions obtained by the participating rms were only relevant to the
extent that these rms had an incentive to change their output, which in its
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turn lead to a new Cournot-Nash equilibrium. There was no direct impact
of cI(qI) on consumers, rivals or producers of inputs.
However, the same is not true when the merger has an impact on the
price insiders pay the producers of inputs, even if output is kept constant.
The previous case had downstream rms choosing their output and the
input price was such that the market cleared. An alternative to this type
of transaction is one in which both downstream and upstream rms bargain
for the intermediate price. We do not model the bargaining game explicitly
but rather assume that larger downstream rms can have lower input unit
prices. It is implicit the idea that larger clients are harder to replace (that
is, are replaced at a higher cost) and therefore are able to get lower prices.
It has been documented that retailers with larger market shares do tend to
have lower unit prices because they are able to impose certain conditions on
their suppliers. Throughout this section we will refer to the merging rms
and their competitors as retailers. Naturally, the argument applies for other
types of upstream/downstream interaction, such as input supplier/producer.
A retailer with a market share of si = qi=Q in the retailing market will
pay the producers a unit price of ri(si); with @ri=@si < 0. This formulation
allows for retailers with the same market share to pay di¤erent prices, for in-
stance, due to di¤erent bargaining skills. We assume that i = (@ri=@si)si=ri
is bigger than  1=(1   si) so that an increase in any given retailers pur-
chases also increases the producers revenue, if all other rms keep their
output constant, that is, marginal acquisition costs are positive for all rms.
In addition to the costs of acquiring the products, each retailer faces a cost
of selling or marketing the goods, given by ci(qi). It is assumed that pro-
ducers are symmetric and receive each an equal percentage of the di¤erence
between aggregate revenue and costs. The outsidersprot function is given
by
i(Q; qi) = P (Q)qi   ri(si)qi   ci(qi)
Given that the bargaining game is not modelled, it is not relevant to
know each producers cost function. The aggregate production costs are
given by CP (Q). As before, we assume that a percentage  of the symmetric
producers are domestic. Therefore, the share of the prots accruing to
domestic producers is also :
After the merger, insiders gain from possible marketing cost reductions
(that is, a new cost function, cI(qI); will represent the insiderscosts) as well
as from a better bargaining position vis-à-vis the producers. It is assumed
that the new unit price is rI(sI) such that rI(sI)qI  mini2I ri(sI)qI , for
any sI and qI : for any given output level, the merged rm does not get
worse conditions than the best of the merging parties could have had before
the merger, when purchasing the post-merger output. The merged rm can
pool its best bargaining assets and obtain better conditions for the same
aggregate market share: As a consequence of the merger there will be a new
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equilibrium, with insiders facing a new cost function.
Following the merger, insiders are again assumed to decrease their out-
put. In the new equilibrium, outsiders will have increased theirs but to a
lesser extent, meaning that total output falls. This means that each outsider
will see its market share increase, getting lower prices when bargaining with
the producers. Despite the fact that each insider will have a lower market
share after the merger, insiders will bargain as a single entity and may also
get lower prices.
The impact of the merger on aggregate welfare is given by
W = CS +RON  TON  CON +RI  TI  CI
+ (TI +TON +TO  CP ) (12)
This can be written as
W = CS+RON   (1 )TON  CON +RI  (1 )TI CI
+ (TO  CP ) (13)
where Ti denotes the change in acquisition costs paid to the producers and
Ri the change in retailersrevenue. The Cis denote the insidersand
outsidersmarketing and selling costs (respectively when i = I;ON ; O) or
the production costs faced by the upstream rms (when i = P ).
The sign of W is di¢ cult to establish because the magnitudes of CI
and TI are unknown. As already mentioned, F&S circumvented this prob-
lem by evaluating the external e¤ect of the merger, XW: Nevertheless, the
domestic external e¤ect is, in this context, given by
XW = CS+RON TON CON+ (TI +TO +TON  CP )
(14)
This aggregate includes the prots of domestic outsiders and producers as
well as consumer surplus and leaves insiders prots aside. As mergers are
expected to be protable (that is, RI CI TI > 0) a positive external
e¤ect is su¢ cient for a positive overall e¤ect of the merger. But, unfortu-
nately, the term TI is included in XW and, like CI ; it is unknown to the
authorities. Therefore, TI cannot be written as a succession of innites-
imal mergers. Neglecting this term and analyzing under which conditions
the remainder is positive is a possible alternative but, if TI < 0; we will be
left with a necessary condition for the external e¤ect to be positive, which
in its turn is a su¢ cient condition for the merger to be welfare increasing.
The relevance of such condition depends on the weight authorities give to
the non-merging parties (outsiders, producers and consumers). Its non ver-
ication could lead to merger rejection if this weight is high enough. The
condition will be taken up below.
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Before analyzing the impact of a marginal merger on welfare, it is rele-
vant to calculate the change in outsidersoutput in response to the change
in the merged rmsoutput.
We will start by dening
fi(si; Q)  @
2(r(si)qi)
@q2i
=
(1  si)2
Q
(
@ri(si)
@si
2 +
@2ri(si)
@s2i
si) < 0 (15)
and noting that
@2(r(si)qi)
@qi@q i
=
si
si   1fi(si; Q) > 0 (16)
It is assumed that the inverse demand curve veries the following condition
@P
@Q
+Q
@2P
@Q2
< 0;8Q : P (Q) > 0 (17)
This guarantees that the rm is marginal revenue shifts downwards if rival
rms increase production, meaning that, as the marginal cost function shifts
upwards, rm is best response function is negatively sloped. It is further
assumed that
1
1  si fi(si; Q) +
@2ci
@q2i
>
@P
@Q
(18)
This condition is su¢ cient for the retailers marginal cost (the selling and
marketing costs plus the acquisition cost) to intersect demand from below.
Each outsider retailer i will maximize its prot given by:
i(qi; Q) = P (Q)qi   ri(si)qi   ci(qi); i 2 O (19)
First-order conditions for prot maximization are
@P
@Q
qi + P (Q)  ri(si)  @ri(si)
@si
(1  si)si   @ci(qi)
@qi
= 0 (20)
The corresponding second-order conditions,
@2P
@Q2
qi + 2
@P
@Q
  fi(si; Q)  @
2ci(qi)
@q2i
< 0 (21)
are veried given the above assumptions. With the purpose of analyzing the
innitesimal merger it is necessary to express each rms change in quantity
as a function of the change in total output.
From the rst-order conditions, each rm will react to a rivals change
in quantity in accordance with
@qi
@q i
=
@2P
@Q2
qi +
@P
@Q   sisi 1fi(si; Q)
 

@2P
@Q2
qi + 2
@P
@Q   fi(si; Q)  @
2ci(qi)
@q2i
 (22)
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The corresponding i is
i   
@2P
@Q2
qi +
@P
@Q +
si
(1 si)fi(si; Q)
 @P@Q + 1(1 si)fi(si; Q) +
@2ci(qi)
@q2i
> 0 (23)
In the linear case, we have
i =
@P
@Q + 2
si(1 si)
Q
@ri(si)
@si
@P
@Q   2 (1 si)Q @ri(si)@si
> 1 (24)
It is useful to know the impact that the change in output will have on
the outsiders market shares:
qidsi = qi
dqiQ  qidQ
Q2
= qi
 iQ  qi
Q2
dQ =  (i + si)sidQ > 0 (25)
In order to establish a su¢ cient condition for the merger to be welfare
increasing we will look at the full e¤ect rather than the external e¤ect. Part
of this full e¤ect depends only on the change in total output. Let us dene
the function XN as the aggregation of the welfare elements that depend only
on aggregate output: consumer surplus, domestic retailers prot, domestic
producersrevenue when selling to all outsiders and insidersrevenue.
XN 
Z Q
0
P (u)du  P (Q)Q+
X
i2ON
(P (Q)qi   ri(si)qi   ci(qi))+
+
X
i2O
ri(si)qi + P (Q)(Q 
X
i2O
qi) (26)
A marginal change in the total quantity produced has the following impact
on XN , after simplication (see appendix)
dXN
PdQ
=
1
"
0@sI + sO   X
i2ON
sii
1A+ X
i2ON
ri(si)
P
isi (1 + i)
 
X
i2O

ri(si)
P
(i + i(i + si)) + (1 
1
"
sI +
X
i2O
i) (27)
The change in total welfare (the full e¤ect) is given by
W =
Z Q1
Q0
dXN
dQ
dQ CI   (1  )TI  CPN (28)
where the superscript 1 denotes the post-merger equilibrium.
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Under the assumptions that insiders reduce production and that these
can get better buying conditions, the term (1   )TI is negative.4 The
same is assumed to hold for CI and CPN .Therefore, a su¢ cient condition
for the merger to be welfare increasing is dXN=PdQ < 0, that is,
1
"
0@sI + sO   X
i2ON
sii
1A+ X
i2ON
ri
P
isi (1 + i)
 
X
i2O

ri
P
(i + i(i + si)) + (1 
1
"
sI +
X
i2O
i) < 0 (29)
The rst term is the extension of the F&S condition for open economies
derived by Barros & Cabral (1994). It reects the impact on consumer
surplus and on domestic retailers prots.
As the costs faced by domestic retailers depend on their rivals aggregate
production (because the rms relative size matters) it is necessary to ac-
count for this e¤ect. This change in costs, not contemplated in the standard
condition, is here represented by the second term. Given that the decrease
in q i increases each retailersmarket share and, consequently, reduces the
acquisition costs ( d(riqi)=dq i = ri (isi(1 + i)) dQ), this negative term
leads to a condition that is weaker than the original one.
However, part of the gain of the domestic retailers is obtained at the
expense of domestic producers. Furthermore, domestic producers may also
receive a lower payment from foreign retailers. The new equilibrium will
have insiders selling less and outsiders selling more. This means that each
outsider rm will have a higher market share and will pay less for each of
the units it re-sells but each outsider retailer will re-sell a larger quantity. If
the elasticity jij is high enough, that is, jij > ii+si this term will have a
positive sign, meaning that the merger is less likely to be benecial because
part of the outsiders gains are, simultaneously, domestic producers losses.
The higher the percentage of domestic rms, , the more di¢ cult it is to
satisfy the condition.
Finally, the last term reects the change in insidersrevenue. It should
be included if insiders are domestic. This term could be excluded if it was
guaranteed that RI  CI > 0: However, one can no longer establish this
because the protability of the merger is not necessarily motivated by the
reduction in the marketing and selling costs. The reduction in acquisition
costs (TI < 0) allows for the possibility of having a protable merger with
RI  CI < 0.
4Note that the insiderscombined market share declines. However, we assume that it
is still larger than the maxi2I fsig which guarantees that rI(s1I) < mini2I fri(si)g and,
consequently, TI  rI(s1I)q1I  
P
i2I ri(si)qi < 0.
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3.1 Particular cases
3.1.1 Closed economy
Note that with  = 1 and O = ; we have the closed economy case. Condi-
tion 29 can be simplied toX
i2O

i
P
@ci
@qi

<  1 (30)
which is never veried. When all rms are domestic and if cost reductions
are not considered, no output reducing merger is desirable. The marginal
valuation for the units that are no longer produced exceeds the marginal
production cost. Given that all agents are domestic, total welfare will nec-
essarily decrease.
3.1.2 Foreign producers or foreign insiders
The case that most resembles the original setting is the one in which all
the producers are foreign, that is, the limit case when  = 0: The fact that
rms may have cost reductions which are, at the same time, lower revenues
for the foreign producers is not relevant for the national authority. When
this is the case, the external e¤ect can be measured accurately because TI
is not relevant as long as the merger is protable, which is a reasonable
assumption. The su¢ cient condition for the desirability of the merger is
dXN
PdQ
=
1
"
0@sI + sO   X
i2ON
sii
1A+ X
i2ON
ri
P
isi (1 + i) < 0 (31)
which, as explained above, is a weaker condition than the one by Barros &
Cabral (1994). The negative second term represents the extra impact on
domestic outsiders expenditure which is smaller because these rmsmarket
share has increased. As the producers are foreign this has a positive net
e¤ect for the domestic economy and the merger is more likely to be welfare
enhancing.
Even when producers are domestic, this is also a necessary condition
for the merger to be desirable for the set of all non-participating agents.
If the authorities focus their attention on consumers, domestic outsiders
and producers, the non verication of 31 leads to merger rejection. This is
particularly useful when the insiders are foreign rms.
4 Conclusions
Most theoretical work on horizontal mergers considers three types of eco-
nomic agents: insiders, outsiders and consumers. Other rms that sell their
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products to insiders or outsiders are generally not considered, although an
exception is the work by Dobson & Waterson (1997). When such rms play
a relevant role we argue that the F&S condition may be inadequate to assess
the desirability of a merger. This happens because upstream rms will see
their prots change after the merger takes place. This note discussed the
limitations of the F&S condition as well as the di¢ culties in the extension
necessary to cope with these mergers.
Two of the features proposed by F&S that clearly simplify the analysis
are the use of the external e¤ect and the innitesimal merger approach.
When the upstream rms are only a¤ected by the merger induced change
in output in the downstream industry, the same technique can be applied.
This happens when the upstream rms are price takers (or price makers
with an exogenous markup). In this case, we show that the safe harbor rule
for merger approval is, in general, weaker but depends on factors such as
the percentage of domestic producers, the elasticity of the supply of inputs
or the markup in this industry.
However, the possibility that the merger may also change the insiders
acquisition cost function, which a¤ects directly not only the insider rms but
also the upstream producers, has some implications on the use of the external
welfare and innitesimal merger approach. When both parties bargain over
the intermediate price, it is likely that the merger may change the insiders
cost function (that is, for the same output for all rms, insiders may get a
lower price). As the external welfare includes prots to upstream producers
that depend on the payment received from the insiders, it would be necessary
to estimate how the merger changes such payment. We therefore focus on
total welfare and provide a su¢ cient condition for the merger to be welfare
increasing which can be simplied under some particular conditions. Such
condition requires that the elasticity of the input price in relation to the
buyers market share is estimated.
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